

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5486

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INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

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AMEMBASSY MADRID

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ALL NATO CAPITALS

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NATO 08089

BELGRADE FOR CSCE DEL

E.O.11652: GDS

TAGS: NATO, CSCE, PARM

SUBJECT: CSCE: FRG PAPER ON SECURITY ISSUES IN PREPARATIONS
FOR BELGRADE

REF: STATE 199934 (DTG 230026Z AUG 77) (NOTAL)

1. THERE FOLLOWS THE TEXT OF A PAPER, DISTRIBUTED AUGUST
23 TO POLADS BY THE FRG REP, WHICH NOTES THE NEED TO
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COORDINATE THE ALLIED ATTITUDE TOWARD LIKELY WP AND NNA
PROPOSALS AT BELGRADE REGARDING NON FIRST USE, FREEZE OF
WARSAW PACT AND NATO MEMBERSHIPS, FOLLOW UP EXPERTS GROUP
ON SECURITY ISSUES, AND MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY.

2. THE ALLIED LINE ON SUCH PROPOSALS SUGGESTED BY THE FRG
GENERALLY CONFORM TO EXISTING ALLIED AND US POSITIONS.

WE NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT THE FRG SUGGESTS THE ALLIES BE RE-
CEPTIVE TO A FOLLOW-UP GROUP ON SECURITY QUESTIONS PRO-
VIDED THE MANDATE IS RESTRICTED TO CBMS AND THE DATES FOR
A MEETING ARE CLEARLY DEFINED. FRG REP TOLD US PRIVATELY
THAT HE TOO WAS STRUCK BY THIS "NEW" POINT IN THE FRG
PAPER. HE ASSUMED THAT HIS AUTHORITIES THOUGHT THIS
MIGHT BE A USEFUL TACTIC IF IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO REACH
AGREEMENT AT BELGRADE ON ALLIED CBMS PROPOSALS. WE
REAFFIRMED TO HIM THAT, AS WE TOLD POLADS IN REGARD TO
THE DRAFT YUGOSLAV RESOLUTION, WE PREFER THAT CBM
DISCUSSION BE COMPLETED WITHIN THE TIME SPAN OF THE
BELGRADE MEETING (REFTEL).

3. FRG REP ALSO TOLD US PRIVATELY THAT ONE FRG PURPOSE
IN PROPOSING DISCUSSION AND COORDINATION OF "AS UNIFIED
A WESTERN ATTITUDE AS POSSIBLE TOWARD EASTERN AND NEUTRAL
PROPOSALS" IN THESE AREAS IS TO INSURE THAT THERE IS NO
WAVERING AT BELGRADE FROM THE ESTABLISHED ALLIED LINE.
COMMENT: WE BELIEVE A REVIEW OF LIKELY EASTERN AND NNA
PROPOSALS AND TACTICS ON SECURITY ISSUES WOULD BE USEFUL.
BUT WE WOULD WISH TO INSURE THAT THERE BE NO DEPARTURE OR
UNNECESSARY EMBROIDERING OF THE ALLIED POSITION ON THE
WP NON-FIRST USE AND FREEZE OF WP AND NATO MEMBERSHIP
PROPOSALS SET FORTH IN THE DECEMBER 1976 NAC MINISTERIAL
COMMUNIQUE WHICH, IN OUR VIEW, SHOULD REMAIN THE BEDROCK
REFERENCE POINT FOR ALLIED REBUTTAL OF SUCH PROPOSALS.
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END COMMENT

4. ACTION REQUESTED: POLADS MAY HAVE AN INITIAL DISCUS-
SION OF THE FRG PAPER AUGUST 30. WE WILL BE GUIDED BY
EXISTING INSTRUCTIONS AND ANY ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE
WASHINGTON MAY WISH TO OFFER.
BEGIN TEXT:

1. IN VIEW OF THE APPROACHING DATE OF THE BEGINNING
OF THE CONFERENCE, WE CONSIDER IT NECESSARY TO
INTENSIFY THE PROCESS OF OPINION-FORMING WITHIN
THE ALLIANCE ON THE QUESTIONS OF SECURITY POLICY.
WE CONSIDER THAT THE COORDINATION OF AN AS UNIFORM
WESTERN ATTITUDE AS POSSIBLE TOWARDS EASTERN AND
NEUTRAL PROPOSALS NOW APPEARS TO BE A REALISTIC
PROSPECT BECAUSE THE INTENTIONS OF THE EAST AS WELL
AS OF THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES IN
THE FIELD OF SECURITY POLICY HAVE NOW EMERGED MORE
CLEARLY.

2. IT IS TO BE EXPECTED THAT THE EAST WILL ALREADY
TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE GENERAL DEBATE OF THE FIRST

CONFERENCE WEEK IN ORDER TO REPEAT, IN THE FIELD
OF SECURITY POLICY, ITS PROPOSALS FROM THE BUCHAREST
WP DECLARATION OF 26 NOVEMBER 1976 WHICH ARE CHIEFLY
DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE A PROPAGANDA EFFECT. THE EAST
WILL REPEATEDLY COME BACK TO THEM AT PLENARY MEETINGS.
THE WEST SHOULD BE ABLE TO GIVE AN ANSWER TO THEM
AS WELL AS TO THE RELEVANT ROMANIAN INITIATIVES AND
TO THE MEDITERRANEAN PROPOSAL BY MALTA, WHICH HAVE
BOTH BEEN ANNOUNCED. MORE PARTICULARLY, WE SHOULD
BE PREPARED FOR THE FOLLOWING PROPOSALS:

- CONCLUSION OF A TREATY ON THE NON-FIRST USE OF

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 NATO 08089

NUCLEAR WEAPONS;

- SUSPENSION OF THE ACCESSION CLAUSES OF THE TWO

ALLIANCE TREATIES;

- CREATION OF A GROUP OF EXPERTS FOR THE DISCUSSION

OF SECURITY-POLICY QUESTIONS AFTER THE BELGRADE
CONFERENCE (ROMANIA);
- REDUCTION OF MILITARY FORCES STATIONED IN THE
MEDITERRANEAN (MALTA).

3. IT IS LIKELY THAT THE EAST WILL GIVE PARTICULAR
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EMPHASIS TO THE NON-FIRST USE PROPOSAL IN BELGRADE.
WE HAVE SAFE INDICATIONS TO THIS EFFECT FROM THE
CONSULTATIONS OF THE RECENT PAST. THUS, THE HEAD
OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION, VORONZOV, STATED TO A
MEMBER OF THE STAFF OF OUR MOSCOW EMBASSY ON 25 MAY
THAT THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES WOULD "HAMMER
THROUGH" THIS PROPOSAL IN SPITE OF THE REACTION
BY NATO, UNTIL IT WOULD BE FINALLY ACCEPTED, JUST
AS THIS HAD BEEN THE CASE WITH THE SOVIET CSCE
INITIATIVE.

4. ALTHOUGH THE EAST CAN BE CERTAIN THAT THE
WEST WILL AGAIN REJECT THIS PROPOSAL, THE EAST
MAY HOPE THAT A PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN ON THE BASIS
OF THIS PROPOSAL MAY HAVE A CERTAIN EFFECT ON PUBLIC
OPINION IN THE NEUTRAL AND EVEN IN WESTERN COUNTRIES,
ALSO IN THE LIGHT OF THE LATEST DISCUSSION ON THE
NEUTRON BOMB. IT IS NECESSARY TO COUNTERACT THIS
INTENTION WITH A CONVINCING AND EFFECTIVE PUBLIC
ARGUMENTATION.

5. WE SUGGEST THAT PRINCIPAL ATTENTION SHOULD BE
GIVEN TO THE FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS:

- IT WAS FOR GOOD REASONS THAT NATO REFERRED TO THE
BUCHAREST PROPOSAL AS UNACCEPTABLE. MOST ALLIES
HAVE AGREED THAT IT IS DESIGNED EXCLUSIVELY TO
FURTHER THE ADVANTAGES OF THE WARSAW PACT AND
THAT IT CANNOT BE REGARDED AS A SERIOUS CONTRIBUTION
TO THE SECURITY-POLICY DIALOGUE BETWEEN EAST AND
WEST. IT CAN ONLY HAVE THE PURPOSE OF PROCURING
ONE SIDED-ADVANTAGES TO THE WARSAW PACT.
- THE ADDRESSEES OF THE BUCHAREST PROPOSAL AGAIN
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CALLED ATTENTION TO THE COMPREHENSIVE BAN ON THE
USE OF FORCE AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE UN CHARTER
BY INCLUDING THE SECOND PRINCIPLE INTO THE LIST

OF PRINCIPLES OF THE CSCE FINAL ACT. THIS RENUNCIATION
OF THE USE OF FORCE APPLIES TO THE USE OF ALL
WEAPONS, NUCLEAR AS WELL AS CONVENTIONAL.

6. WE SUGGEST THAT THE MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE
SHOULD ADHERE TO THE ARRANGEMENTS MADE IN PARA. 1B
(MATTERS RELATED TO GIVING EFFECT TO CERTAIN OF THE
ABOVE PRINCIPLES). IN THIS PART OF THE FINAL ACT,
THE PARTICIPATING STATES, AMONG OTHER THINGS, UNDERTOOK

- TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION, BY ALL THE WAYS
AND FORMS WHICH THEY CONSIDER APPROPRIATE, TO
THE DUTY TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF
FORCE IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH ONE ANOTHER,
- TO REFRAIN FROM ANY USE OF ARMED FORCES INCONSISTENT
WITH THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER
OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE
DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN
PARTICIPATING STATES, AGAINST ANOTHER PARTICIPATING
STATE, IN PARTICULAR FROM INVASION OF OR ATTACK
ON ITS TERRITORY;
- TO REFRAIN FROM ANY MANIFESTATION OF FORCE FOR
THE PURPOSE OF INDUCING ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE
TO RENOUNCE THE FULL EXERCISE OF ITS SOVEREIGN
RIGHTS.

7. WE ARE AWARE TO A PARTICULAR DEGREE OF THE
TERRIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF A NUCLEAR, BUT ALSO OF A
CONVENTIONAL CONFLICT IN EUROPE. THIS IS WHY NATO'S
DETERRENCE AND DEFENCE STRATEGY AIMS AT THE PREVENTION
OF ANY ARMED CONFLICT, BE IT NUCLEAR OR CONVENTIONAL.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5488

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 NATO 08089

THE NATO STRATEGY FINDS ITS CONCRETE EXPRESSION
IN THE BALANCED NATURE AND THE TRIAD OF CONVENTIONAL,
TACTICAL-NUCLEAR AND STRATEGIC-NUCLEAR DETERRENCE.
ITS CREDIBILITY IS BASED ON THE ABILITY OF THE
ALLIANCE TO USE THE MEANS REQUIRED FOR SELF-DEFENCE
IN A FLEXIBLE MANNER AGAINST ANY FORM OF AGGRESSION,
THEREBY ENSURING THAT THE RISK OF AGGRESSION REMAINS
INCALCULABLE TO A POTENTIAL AGGRESSOR.

8. IF A POTENTIAL AGGRESSOR COULD RECKON WITH A
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LIMITATION TO CONVENTIONAL WARFARE, AN EXCLUSIVELY
CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE WOULD LIMIT THE RISK OF THE
AGGRESSOR AND WOULD PLACE THE BURDEN OF WARFARE
ESSENTIALLY ON THE DIRECT VICTIMS OF AGGRESSION.
THE MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE ALLIANCE CAN ONLY ENSURE
DETERRENCE AGAINST AGGRESSION IF THEY ARE ABLE TO
DEMONSTRATE TO THE POTENTIAL AGGRESSOR THE INHERENT
RISKS UP TO THE STRATEGIC-NUCLEAR LEVEL.

9. IN CASE OF RENUNCIATION OF THE NON-FIRST USE
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, EVEN FOR SELF-DEFENCE, THE EASTERN
SUPERIORITY IN THE CONVENTIONAL FIELD WOULD GROW
EVEN FURTHER. IN VIEW OF THE UNCHANGED POLITICAL
AND IDEOLOGICAL RIVALRY BETWEEN EAST AND WEST - AS
THE EAST GOES ON TO PROCLAIM - THE WARSAW PACT
WOULD THEN STAND AN EVEN BETTER CHANCE TO TRANSLATE
ITS CONVENTIONAL STRENGTH INTO POLITICAL PRESSURE.
THE RESULT WOULD BE LESS, AND NOT MORE, POLITICAL AND
MILITARY STABILITY IN EUROPE.

10. COMPARATIVELY LESS WEIGHT SHOULD BE ATTACHED
TO THE EASTERN PROPOSAL TO SUSPEND THE ACCESSION
CLAUSES OF THE TWO ALLIANCE TREATIES (NATO AND WP).

IT IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE FIRST PRINCIPLE OF THE FINAL ACT AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE REJECTED AS A CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE FINAL ACT.

11. THE ROMANIANS ARE LIKELY FURTHER TO PURSUE THEIR VERY FAR-REACHING SECURITY POLICY PROPOSALS (ABOLITION OF MILITARY BASES, THE EVACUATION OF FOREIGN FORCES FROM THE TERRITORIES OF OTHER STATES, REDUCTION OF NATIONAL FORCES, LOWERING OF MILITARY BUDGETS, CREATION OF DENUCLEARIZED ZONES, ABOLITION
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OF THE MILITARY BLOCKS) WHICH DID NOT STAND A CHANCE OF BEING ACCEPTED IN GENEVA, EITHER BY THE EAST OR BY THE WEST. THERE MAY ALSO BE A NEW PROPOSAL FOR THE CONCLUSION OF AN "ALL-EUROPEAN PACT FOR FORCE RENUNCIATION" WHICH WAS MENTIONED BY CEAUSESCU IN A SPEECH IN MARCH 1977.

12. THE WESTERN REACTION TO THIS PROPOSAL SHOULD BE COORDINATED. WE SUGGEST THAT THE MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE SHOULD CALL ATTENTION TO THE FORCE RENUNCIATION PROVIDED FOR IN THE UN CHARTER AND IN THE FINAL ACT ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS AND THAT THEY ALSO STATE THAT THEY DO NOT CONSIDER THIS PROPOSAL TO BE A SUITABLE SUBJECT FOR BELGRADE.

13. AS FAR AS THE FURTHER PROPOSAL - ALSO TO BE EXPECTED BY THE ROMANIAN SIDE - IS CONCERNED THAT A GROUP OF EXPERTS SHOULD BE SET UP TO DISCUSS SECURITY-POLICY QUESTIONS AFTER THE BELGRADE MEETING, AN AGREED VIEW SHOULD BE WORKED OUT IN NATO. AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, WE ARE NOT IN FAVOUR OF SETTING UP SUCH A GROUP OF EXPERTS. NEVERTHELESS, WE SUGGEST THAT WE SHOULD BE RECEPTIVE TO THIS QUESTION. IT SHOULD BE A CONDITION FOR AGREEMENT TO THE SETTING-UP OF A GROUP OF EXPERTS THAT ITS MANDATE (WE ARE INTERESTED IN AN EXHAUSTIVE DISCUSSION OF CBM IMPLEMENTATION AND NOT THE PURSUIT OF NEW ARMS CONTROL PROJECTS) AND THE DATES FOR A MEETING OF EXPERTS SHOULD BE CLEARLY DEFINED.

14. AT THE PREPARATORY MEETING IN BELGRADE, MALTA SUBMITTED FAR-REACHING PROPOSALS FOR AN INTENSIFICATION OF THE DIALOGUE WITH THE NON-PARTICIPATING MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES AND FOR THE CREATION OF A PERMANENT COMMITTEE FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. MALTA WILL ALSO TRY AT THE MAIN MEETING TO GIVE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 NATO 08089

STRONGER EMPHASIS TO SECURITY-POLICY QUESTIONS AFFECTING
THE REGION. WE BELIEVE THAT, AT THE BELGRADE MEETING,
WE SHOULD NOT GO BEYOND A GENERAL DECLARATION ON
THE DESIRABILITY OF REDUCED MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN
THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION. LIKE OTHER ALLIES, WE ARE,
MOREOVER, OF THE OPINION THAT AN EXTENSION OF
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES TO THE MEDITERRANEAN
IS OUT OF THE QUESTION IN VIEW OF THE EXISTING
SECURITY-POLICY SITUATION OF THIS REGION. THE NATO
MILITARY AUTHORITIES STRICTLY REJECT CORRESPONDING
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PROPOSALS (YUGOSLAVIA).

15. WE WOULD CONSIDER IT ADVISABLE TO CONSULT THE
MALTESE PROPOSALS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE.

END TEXT. GLITMAN

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